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Empowering and Protecting Patients:

Lessons for Physician-Assisted Suicide
from the African-American Experience
Patricia A. King* and Leslie E. Wolft
While we were watching round her bed,
She turned her eyes and looked away,
She saw what we couldn't see;
She saw Old Death. She saw Old Death.
Coming like a falling star.
But Death didn'tfrighten Sister Caroline;
He looked to her like a welcome friend.
And she whispered to us: rm going home,
And she smiled and closedher eyes.'

The increasing medicalization of death has led to widespread fear that death is unnecessarily prolonged, painful, expensive, and without dignity. This fear has given momentum
to the desire of patients to have more control over their dying
and to the movement to legalize physician-assisted suicide
(PAS) and active voluntary euthanasia (AVE). Others may
have a different fear. They may be concerned that their lives
are not highly valued in this society and thus fear that they
will not have access to life-prolonging treatment or palliative
care that, for them, represents death with dignity. Moreover,
many others may not share either of these fears, considering
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Law, Medicine, Ethics and Public
Policy, Georgetown University Law Center; J.D. 1969, Harvard Law School;
BA. 1963, Wheaton College.
t Greenwall Fellow in Bioethics and Health Policy, Georgetown University and Johns Hopkins University; A.B. 1988, Stanford University; J.D.
1991, Harvard Law School; M.P.H. 1997, Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene
and Public Health.
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1. JAMES WELDON JOHNSON, Go Down Death-A Funeral Sermon, in
GOD'S TROMBONES 27, 29 (Penguin Books 1990) (1927).
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death a "welcome friend" to be greeted with family or, in any
event, a process that is beyond their control. Making sure that
all of these voices are heard in the PAS debate is a challenge.
While we share many of the concerns and values espoused
by proponents of PAS and AVE, we believe that existing prohibitions on PAS and AVE should be maintained for the foreseeable future. Central to our argument is the view that this
society does not have a sufficient understanding of how and
why competent individuals are rendered vulnerable near the
end of life. We are especially concerned that inadequate attention has been given to the sociohistorical and cultural contexts in which competent individuals function. If we do not
fully appreciate the multiple ways in which an individual's
autonomy and well-being can be compromised, we cannot modify existing institutional arrangements and practices in the
health care system in ways that will empower and protect all
patients. It is important to empower patients so that their decisions will be respected, while at the same time protecting
them from abuse and exploitation.
When the Supreme Court held unanimously in Washington v. Glucksberg2 and Vacco v. Quill3 that state laws prohibiting assisted suicides did not violate the Due Process Clause or
the Equal Protection Clause, the opinions of the Justices reflected concern that the interests of all patients should be protected. For example, the majority opinion in Glucksberg recognized that states have an interest "in protecting vulnerable
groups-including the poor, the elderly, and disabled personsfrom abuse, neglect, and mistakes."4 Quoting the work of the
New York State Task Force on Life and the Law (New York
Task Force), the majority opinion stated that "[t]he risk of
harm is greatest for the many individuals in our society whose
autonomy and well-being are already compromised by poverty,
lack of access to good medical care, advanced age or membership in a stigmatized social group."' Significantly, the opinion
pointed out that "Itihe State's interest [in protecting the interests of all patients] goes beyond protecting the vulnerable from
coercion; it extends to protecting disabled and terminally ill
2. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
3. 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
4. 117 S. Ct. at 2273.
5. Id. at 2273 (quoting THE N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE
LAW, WHEN DEATH Is SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE
MEDICAL CONTEXT 120 (1994) [hereinafter N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE]).
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people from prejudice, negative and inaccurate stereotypes and
'societal indifference."'
As a result of the rulings in these two cases, the states will
have the responsibility for insuring that the interests of patients near the end of life are not imperiled. Whether it is
possible for the states to make available at this time a compassionate option of last resort for some competent, terminally
ill patients, without, as a practical matter, making it harder for
other patients to exercise their preferences for life prolonging
treatment or palliative care, is a vexing public policy matter.
Since more attention has been paid to elaborating the principles and rules that should govern practices at the end of life
than to ascertaining whether the principles or rules can be effectively implemented in the context of actual decisionmaking,
the states' task will be complicated. As the New York Task
Force has pointed out: "For purposes of public debate, one can
describe cases of assisted suicide in which all recommended
safeguards would be satisfied. But positing an 'ideal' or 'good'
case is not sufficient for public policy, if it bears little relation
to prevalent social and medical practices."7 Moreover, the
medical context is inextricably linked with the social and economic inequities existing in the broader society. Again, as the
New York Task Force persuasively notes, "no matter how carefully any guidelines are framed, assisted suicide and euthanasia
will be practiced through the prism of social inequality and
bias that characterizes the delivery of services in all segments
of our society, including health care."8
This Article examines the African-American experience
with medicine for the insights that such scrutiny offers about
the vulnerability of competent individuals.9 We begin by offering reasons why such a perspective is critical to development of
policies about PAS and AVE and end-of-life decisionmaking
generally. It is important to reflect on the African-American
experience because it offers insights into the nature of society's responsibilities for those who are competent but whose autonomy

6. Id.
7. N.Y. STATE TAsKFORcE, supra note 5, at xiii.
8. Id. at 125.
9. This article uses the terms black and African-American interchangeably. For a brief discussion of the terms used to describe persons who
descend from African slaves, see The Emergence of the Term "AfricanAmeNcan' at Two PrestigiousInstitutions:THE NEW YORK TIMES and the Supreme
Court, 16 J. BLACK HIGHER EDUc. 12 (1997).

1018

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:1015

and well-being may be compromised by historical, social, and
cultural forces at work in society itself. Thus, some individuals
are in need of protection because they have been rendered vulnerable by their own society.
We turn next to a historical exploration of the relationship
between African-Americans and medicine, because, in order to
understand the black patient today, there must be some appreciation of the legacy that is carried forward in memories of
those who went before. This examination makes clear that, as
a historical matter, black lives have not been as highly valued
as white lives. We continue by documenting existing disparities in health status, access to health care, and the scope and
quality of health care between blacks and whites. The existence of these disparities perpetuates the view among AfricanAmericans that their lives are devalued. Significantly, these
disparities also indicate that blacks are severely disadvantaged
in negotiating all aspects of the health care system.
Initial efforts to understand the causes of these disparities
suggest that their existence may be due to limited access to health
care, cultural differences, differences in patient preferences, and
unconscious bias. This preliminary work offers insights about
the role of race, culture, and mistrust in the physician-patient
relationship and medicine generally. It suggests that AfricanAmericans as a group have little reason to believe that their
preferences regarding end-of-life decisions will be either understood or respected.
We conclude by indicating ways in which the AfricanAmerican experience with medicine might inform the states'
consideration of PAS and AVE. We hope that others will be
motivated to offer similar analyses of other groups for the implications that their history and culture have for PAS.
THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN EXPERIENCE ILLUMINATES

THE PAS DEBATE
In a real sense all patients near the end of life are at risk
of having their autonomy and well-being compromised. It is
commonly accepted, however, that members of certain groups
are at special risk and perhaps in need of protection. The term
vulnerable, which is applied to a broad spectrum of groups, reflects this concern. What makes group members vulnerable, or
how their vulnerability is the same or different across groups,
however, is neither well defined nor understood.
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There is broad consensus that groups whose members lack
capacity altogether or have impaired capacity should be viewed
as vulnerable. There is less agreement on whether groups
whose members are primarily competent adults, such as prisoners
or physically disabled persons, should be considered vulnerable
to coercion. Even if we can agree that these groups are deserving of special attention, controversy may remain about what
circumstances, conditions, or social practices should trigger
closer scrutiny of decisions made by members of the group."0
Whether particular group members, in contrast to groups
themselves, are at special risk of coercion, presents an even
more difficult question to unravel. Individuals may belong to
multiple groups and thereby be potentially vulnerable for
many different reasons. Alternatively, individual members of
a group that is regarded as vulnerable may not be susceptible
to coercion or undue influence. Here the danger is that appeal
to a shared experience may obscure the heterogeneity of group
members."
Our dilemma is this: There is general agreement that
with competent adults paternalism or interference with selfdetermination should be avoided. At the same time there is
fear that the institutional and social context will constrain
competent patients' choices in such a way as to suggest that
their choices are coerced. We seem to have only two options.
One approach is to protect vulnerable persons through increased vigilance or special procedural safeguards.
Frequently, however, there is disagreement about how to modulate
such restrictions. On the one hand, weaker safeguards that
promote self-determination may provide so little protection
that exploitation results. On the other hand, stronger safeguards may result in denying desired benefits to individuals
who are members of the group we are seeking to protect.
An alternative approach permits competent persons to
make choices. This approach ignores the conditions that make
for vulnerability and emphasizes the potential and undesirability
of paternalism, leaving vulnerable persons to look after themselves and to secure access to benefits they desire. The Ninth

10. For a general consideration of these issues, see ALAN WERTHEIMER,
COERCION (1987).
1i
See EzABETHV. SPELMAN, INFSSENTAL WOMAN, at ix (1988) (discussing
how generic grouping under a label, such as woman, "obscures the heterogeneity of women).
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2 is
Circuit opinion in Compassion in Dying v. Washington"
instructive in this regard. The majority opinion reasoned:

This rationale [prohibiting PAS in order to protect the poor and minorities from exploitation] simply recycles one of the more disingenuous and fallacious arguments raised in opposition to the legalization
of abortion. It is equally meretricious here.... [As with abortion,
there is far more reason to raise the opposite concern: the concern
that the poor and the minorities, who have historically received the
least adequate health care, will not be afforded a fair opportunity to
obtain the medical assistance to which they are entitled-the assistance that would allow them to end their lives with a measure of
dignity. The argument that disadvantaged persons will receive more
medical services than the remainder of the population... is ludicrous
on its face. So, too, is the argument that the poor and the minorities
will rush to volunteer for physician-assisted suicide because of their
inability to secure adequate medical treatment. 3

The court ignores the fact that minorities and the poor
have historically been abused and had their preferences ignored, if indeed their preferences were solicited at all. While it
correctly points out that some minority group members may be
denied a benefit that they seek, the court overlooks the fact
that minorities might prefer, rather than access to PAS, benefits
that promote health and well-being in view of existing inequities in health status, health care coverage, and the delivery of
health care services. Even if minority individuals desired access to PAS, they would not necessarily be able to secure this
or other benefits because they lack power in the society. Thus,
neither approach is optimal because each fails to guarantee access to benefits and avoidance of harm.
It is therefore important to assess carefully the conditions
of inclusion or access to benefits. For example, an empowered
patient may need fewer protections from society because the
ability to protect oneself may have increased. The starting
point, then, is to develop thick descriptions of patients in order
to learn why, if at all, they are vulnerable. We need to know
patients not merely in terms of abnormalities in the structure
and function of their body organs and systems, but also as persons
situated in broader social, economic, historical and cultural
contexts.' 4 In actual encounters with health care professionals,
12. 79 F.3d 790 (1996) (en banc), rev'd sub noma. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
13. Id. at 825.
14. See Arthur Kleinman et al., Culture, Illness, and Care: Clinical Lessons from Anthropologic and Cross-CulturalResearch, 88 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 251 (1978) (stating "physicians treat diseases"while "patients suffer ill-

1998]

EMPOWERBVG & PROTECTINGPATIENTS

1021

the patient's understanding of illness and how the patient
communicates about his or her health problems is shaped by
these factors. We also need to understand who the physician
is, the dynamics of the relationship between professional and
patient, and the impact of societal structures on that relationship. It is only by understanding these matters that we will be
able to identify and modify the structural inequities in medicine that compromise the interests of competent persons when
making end-of-life decisions.
An examination of the African-American patient will expand the array of portraits of patients who face death and
worry about dying with dignity. In expanding the images of
patients faced with end-of-life decision making, we enhance our
understanding of patients' cultural, religious, and family values, and the complexity of decisionmaking with respect to PAS.
Some of these patients will prefer life-prolonging treatment or
palliative care. Other patients will not seek access to PAS and
AVE because they mistrust health care professionals and
medical institutions.
Yale Kamisar points out that "[m]any people, understandably, are greatly affected by the heart-wrenching facts of
individual cases."'5 There is no doubt that the suffering and
anguish of some patients is compelling. Many people identify
with these patients and worry that they will find themselves in
the same position. We are understandably reluctant to deny
interventions that would relieve suffering and bring about desired relief through death. There are also moving stories that
demonstrate the dangers of too quickly acceding to requests for
PAS and euthanasia. Yet the portraits of potential victims of
PAS and euthanasia have attracted less public attention. John
Arras, a philosopher and bioethicist writes:
The victims of the current policy are easy to identify: they are on the
news, the talk shows, the documentaries, and often on Dr. Kevorkian's roster of so-called "patients." The victims of legalization, by
contrast, will be largely hidden from view: they will include the clinically depressed 80-year-old man who could have lived for another
year of good quality if only he had been treated; the 50-year-old
woman who asks for death because doctors in her financially
ness"); Dorothy E. Roberts, Reconstructing the Patient:Starting with Women
of Color, in FEM]NISM & BIOETHIcS 116 (Susan M. Wolf ed., 1996) (arguing
medical ethics has focused on the treatment of disease rather than on the patient and the patientfs values).
15. Yale Kamisar, The Reasons So Many People Support PhysicianAssisted Suicide--And Why These Reasons Are Not Convincing, 12 IssuEs L.
&MED. 113, 113 (1996).
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stretched HMO cannot/will not effectively treat her unrelenting but
mysterious pelvic pain; and perhaps eventually, if we slide far enough
down the slope, the uncommunicative stroke victim whose distant
children deem an earlier death a better death. Unlike Dr. Kevorkian's "patients," these victims will not get their pictures in the paper, but they will have faces and they will all be cheated of good
months or perhaps even years."
Most descriptions of potential victims of legalizing PAS, how-

ever, fail7 to include images of members of stigmatized minority
groups.'
There is evidence that members of those groups regarded
as vulnerable have different attitudes about end-of-life treatment than do the majority of Americans who support assisting
the terminally ill to die. Disparities are greatest, however, in
attitudes, values, and beliefs about end-of-life decisionmaking
with racial and ethnic minorities. Studies show that blacks are
substantially less likely than whites to support legalization of

PAS.'8 Although the support for legalization has increased over

time in both groups, the gap in support between blacks and
whites persists.'9 There is also evidence that these differences

16. John Arras, News from the Circuit Courts: How Not to Think About
Physician-Assisted Suicide, BIOLAW, July-Aug. 1996, Special Section, at
S:171, S:184-185.
17. An exception is a composite description of an elderly black woman in
Annette Dula, The Life and Death of Miss Mildred, 10 CLINICAL ETHICs 419
(1994). Sister Mildred says at one point:
[L]ook like every time I turn on the TV, somebody's talking about
euthanasia, and doctors helping kill off old and sick folks. Well, I
ain't seen them ask nary a elderly black on none of them TV shows
and news programs what they thought about euthanasim I believe
the Lord will take me away when it's time to go.
Id. at 424-25.
For a literary exploration of black experience of health and illness see
TRIALS, TRIBULATIONS, AND CELEBRATIONS: AFRICAN-AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ON HEALTH, ILLNESS, AGING AND Loss (Marion Gray Secundy ed.,
1992) [hereinafter TRIBULATIONS & CELEBRATIONS].
18. See Robert J. Blendon & Ulrike S. Szalay, The American Public and
the Future of the Right-to-Die Debate, in REFORMING THE SYSTEM: CONTAINING HEALTH CARE COSTS IN AN ERA OF UNIVERSAL COVERAGE 223 (Robert
J. Blendon & Tracey Stelzer Hyams eds., 1992); P.V. Caralis et al., The Influence of Ethnicity and Race on Attitudes Toward Advance Directives, LifeProlonging Treatments, and Euthanasia,4 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 155 (1993);
Harold G. Koenig et al., Attitudes of Elderly Patients and Their Families Toward Physician-Assisted Suicide, 156 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2240 (1996);
Richard L. Lichtenstein et al, Black/White Differences in Attitudes Toward
Physician-AssistedSuicide, 89 J. NAT'L MED. ASSN 125 (1997); V.V. Prakasa
Rao et al., Racial Differences in Attitudes Toward Euthanasia,2 EUTHANASIA
REV. 260 (1988).
19. See Lichtenstein et al., supra note 18, at 126.
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arise in attitudes towards other end-of-life issues, such as use
of life-prolonging treatment, advance directives, and living

wills 2

Why these substantial gaps in attitudes about end-of-life
decisionmaking exists is not clear and warrants additional
study. The available evidence indicates that these differences
persist even when controlling for education, age, and socioeconomic status.2 1 Possible reasons for this difference in attitude
include religious preferences, blacks' distrust of physicians,
medical institutions, and the health care system generally,'
and cultural characteristics like trusting families more than
physicians.24
Specifically, these differences in attitude towards PAS may
reflect differences in black expression of health and illness as
Not only have Africanwell as concerns about death.
Americans experienced disrespect for their autonomy, they
have suffered injustice in medicine as well as in the broader
society. As a group, blacks have been abused, neglected, and
exploited. They have reason to believe that their lives are not
valued in the same way as whites, and in their encounters with
the health care system they frequently perceive that they are
Africantreated differently solely because of their race.'
Americans have reason to be suspicious of physicians and
rightly worry about giving them too much authority. In the
20. See id. at 129; Joshua M. Hauser et al., Minority Populationsand Advance Directives:Insights from a Focus Group Methodology, 6 CAMBRIDGE Q.
HEALTHCARE ETHICS 58 (1997); Sheila T. Murphy et al., Ethnicity and Advance CareDirectives, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 108 (1996).
21. See Lichtenstein et al., supra note 18, at 126; Murphy et al., supra
note 20, at 115.
22. See Lichtenstein et al., supra note 18, at 123; Murphy et al., supra
note 20, at 116. In one study, religion seemed both to assist a patienfs recovery and to constrain the physician's authority. See Hauser et al., supra note
20, at 65.
23. See Caralis, supra note 18, at 161; Lichtenstein et al., supra note 18,
at 133; Murphy et al., supra note 20, at 116.
24. See Lichtenstein et al., supra note 18, at 133. The Hauser focus group
on advance directives generated this report: "For a number of the African
American participants, family was perceived as protectors against physicians:
'I don't know about the physicians because I don't trust all physicians. No offense. Life is life. Lefts face facts .... So I would try to let my family know.
People that I think, you know, that care for me.' Hauser et al., supra note 20,
at 62.
25. See Annette Dula, African American Suspicion of the HealthcareSystem Is Justified: What Do We Do About It?, 3 CAMBRIDGE Q. HALUHCA.E
ETHICS 347 (1994).
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medical context, physician paternalism builds on and reenforces
race differentials in power and authority that occur in the
broader society. In short, historical and current experiences
with American medicine have made African-Americans acutely
aware of the difficulty of looking after their own interests.
Ordinary practices, norms, and habits of well-intentioned
institutions and professions can result in unjust practices visA-vis some groups.26 Those with power in the society are able to
impose their norms, values, and beliefs on those who lack
power. The dominant group's ideas, beliefs, and judgments
serve to stigmatize and mark other groups as different and deficient. Behaviors and practices of the stigmatized group are
often considered unworthy of study or respect.
The myth of white superiority persists and has profoundly
affected both whites and blacks. As Professor Charles Lawrence notes, "We do not recognize the ways in which our
[shared] cultural experience has influenced our beliefs about
race or the occasions on which those beliefs affect our actions."27
Stereotypes that capture and reflect negative attitudes towards
African-Americans flourish and become embedded in the culture to the point where they may not be consciously noticed.
Thus, injury frequently is inflicted on blacks without the actor
being consciously aware of racial motivation.28
It is not only the dominant group, however, that is affected. The negative messages are also absorbed by blacks.
Feelings of inferiority and unworthiness are among the psychic
injuries inflicted on blacks. As a result, in addition to all the
disadvantages that blacks suffer, they carry the additional
burden of not always appreciating their own worth as human
beings. As Herbert Nickens points out, "such stigma is never
far from consciousness for minorities and is one of the lenses
through which life is perceived."29
26. For a more complete account of this aspect of justice, see IRIS MARION
YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 39 (1990).

27. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Epidemiology of Color-Blindness:Learning
to Think and Talk About Race, Again, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1, 4 (1995).
28. See Charles R. Lawrence MI, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with UnconsciousRacism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
29. Herbert Nickens, The Genome Project and Health Services for Minority Populations, in THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT AND THE FUTURE OF
HEALTH CARE 58, 65 (Thomas H. Murray et al. eds., 1996). A particularly
chilling example of internalization of negative stereotypes by AfricanAmerican children is recounted in Marc Elrich, The Stereotype Within: Why
Students Don't Buy Black History Month, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1994, at C1.
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Although other racial and ethnic groups have separate and
distinct experiences with American medicine, an additional
reason for examining the African-American experience is that
in some real sense African-Americans are the paradigmatic
minority group in this country. They constitute approximately
twelve percent of the population. Although they were not
willing immigrants and endured slavery and its aftermath of
rigid segregation, as people of color they have not been easily
assimilated and do not share the western European heritage
and culture of some immigrants. Features of black health experience such as persistent poverty, limited access to health
care, different health status, and low numbers of health care
professionals are common to other minorities as well.
AN INHERENT DISmUST OF MEDICINE

The relationship between blacks and medicine has, in the
main, not been beneficial for blacks. Medicine played a critical
role in the development of racial differences that stamped
blacks as an inherently inferior people." It provided much of
the theory and data that supported beliefs about biological differences observed in differences in skin color, hair, appearance,
30. See, e.g., TODD L. SAvITT, MEDICINE AND SLAVERY: THE DISEASES AND
HEALTH CARE OF BLACKS IN ANTEBELLUM VIRGINIA 7 (1978); Atwood Gaines,
Race and Racism, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICs 2189 (Warren T. Reich
ed., rev'd ed. 1995).
Race is an imprecise concept used to explain differences between humans.
The major theoretical issue is whether race is a matter of nature or of culture.
Gamble and Blustein explain the two approaches as follows:
Biological constructionists hold that races are genetic entities that
are fixed, immutable, and genetically determined.... The social construction model holds that race is a social, historical, and political
entity without any essential biological coherence. It is not a natural,
fixed category; rather it has been created by society to recognize difference and establish social relationships.... [Ilt cannot be understood outside of its historical and social context.
Vanessa Northington Gamble & Bonnie Ellen Blustein, Racial Differentialsin
Medical Care:Implicationsfor Research on Women, in 2 WOMEN AND HEALTH
RESEARCH: ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF INCLUDING WOMEN IN CLINICAL
STUDIES 174, 175 (Anna C. Mastroianni et al eds., 1994) [hereinafter WOMEN
AND HEALTH RESEARCH].

In addition, the relationship between the terms 'race' and 'ethnicity' is not
well understood. In general, ethnicity pertains to characteristics of a group of
people who share a culture, religion, language or the like. In health care and
health research classifying patients and subjects in terms of ethnic group
identity may provide valuable information about lifestyle, diet, or values that
relate to health outcomes. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra, at

115-19.
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and behavior between blacks and whites and confirmed the superiority of whites.31
The assumption that blacks were biologically inferior to
whites paved the way for abuse and exploitation of blacks in
medical research, education, and experimentation. Racial ideology posed obstacles to the development of adequate health care
for blacks. Biological explanations were sometimes invoked to
explain black-white differences in health. Indeed, race is still
used without appropriate explanation as a key variable in
medical and epidemiological research because the assumption
is that race conveys important health information. Medicine's
interest in black health status historically was motivated by
self-interest of whites rather than the needs of AfricanAmericans. Suspicion of medical professionals and institutions
explains why African-Americans are likely to approach PAS
with caution.
A MEANS TO ACHIEVE THE ENDS OF OTHERS

The rise of medical institutions in the nineteenth century
affected blacks in at least two ways: (1) Blacks were used as
specimens for clinical instruction and public display,32 and (2)
blacks were disproportionately involved in research and experimentation.3 3 Further, although there was widespread public sentiment opposed to dissection and autopsy, black bodies
were used because blacks were in no position to protect their
dead.34 Professor Todd Savitt notes that "[s]outhern medical
schools could and did boast that their cities' large black populations provided ample supplies of clinical and anatomical material. White physicians trained at these institutions carried
with them into their own careers this idea of the medical usefulness of blacks."35
Use of black bodies for dissection and autopsy is just one
example in a long history of blacks being used as a means to

3L See John S. Haller, Jr., The Physician Versus the Negro: Medical and
Anthropological Concepts of Race in the Late Nineteenth Century, 44 BULL.
HIST. MED. 154, 157 (1970).
32. See Todd L. Savitt, The Use of Blacks for Medical Experimentation
and Demonstrationin the Old South, 48 J. S. HIST. 331, 333 (1982).
33. See SAVITT, supra note 30, at 282.
34. See David C. Humphrey, Dissection and Discrimination:The Social
Origins of Cadavers in America, 1760-1915, 49 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 819,
820 (1973).
35. Savitt, supra note 32, at 341.
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achieve the ends of others in medical research and experimentation.36 During slavery, blacks were subject to experimental
procedures that were painful and exploitive.37 After slavery,
the extent to which blacks were experimental subjects without
their consent has not been documented. Professor Vanessa
Northington Gamble's examination of folklore in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries makes clear that blacks
believed that these practices persisted?8 It is clear that concerns
about abuse and exploitation of blacks in medical experimentation were used to press for the creation of black-controlled
hospitals in the early twentieth century.39
The best known twentieth century example of the use of
blacks as unconsenting experimental subjects is the Tuskegee
Syphilis Study. It illustrates the nature of the relationship between medicine and blacks that evolved during slavery, continued during the post-emancipation period, and, in some aspects, is
still prevalent today.
The United States Public Health Service (PHS) sponsored
the Tuskegee Study which began in 1932 and lasted 40 years.
It involved 399 black men who lived in Macon County, Alabama.' The study was intended to observe the effects of untreated syphilis on blacks and thus held out no promise of
benefit to the subjects. The subjects never consented. They
were never given important information about the study.

36. For an exploration of the involvement of African-Americans in medical research, see Patricia A. King, Race, Justice, and Research, in BEYOND
CONSENT (Jeffrey P. Kahn et al. eds., forthcoming 1998).
37. For example, Dr. Marion Sims, considered by medical historians to be
the father of American gynecology and a former president of the American
Medical Association, used slave women in developing surgical procedures to
repair vesico-vaginal fistulas, or tears in the vaginal wall, that resulted in
chronic leakage from the bladder. Dr. Sims operated repeatedly on three
slave women, without the benefit of anesthesia, and only sought white volunteers for the procedure after its success was demonstrated in the slave
women. See Diana E. Axelsen, Women as Victims of Medical Experimentation: J. MarionSims'Surgery on Slave Women, 1845-1850, SAGE, Fall 1995, at
10, 10-12; David A. Richardson, Ethics in Gynecologic Surgical Innovation,
170 AM. J. OBSTETICS & GYNECOLOGY 1 (1994) (detailing Dr. Sims's wrongful operations).
38. See Vanessa Northington Gamble, Underthe Shadow of Tuskegee: AfricanAmericans and Health Care, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1773, 1774 (1997).
39. See VANESSA NORTHINGTON GAMBLE, MAKING A PLACE FOR
OURSELVES: THE BLACK HOsPrrAL MOvEMENT 1920-1945, at 13 (1995).
40. The seminal account of the Tuskegee syphilis experiment is found in
JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS ExPERIMENT
(expanded ed. 1993).
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When effective treatment for syphilis became available, the
subjects were not provided with penicillin. Indeed measures
were taken to prevent their treatment.
Assumptions about biologically based differences in disease between blacks and whites and negative stereotypes about
blacks played an important role in the creation and implementation of the Tuskegee Study. For example, the investigators
accepted the medical view prevailing in the United States that
syphilis affected blacks differently than whites. The PHS doctors believed that blacks had different sexual natures than
whites and that blacks were more promiscuous. They also
wrongly believed that blacks would not seek medical care.4
The PHS investigators took advantage of the bleak social
and economic situation of the subjects. These men were poor
and lived in a rural and segregated county in the Deep South.
They were accustomed to responding to the authority of whites.
Offers of free health care and payment of burial expenses were
powerful incentives for participation in the Tuskegee Study. In
sum, although these men were capable of making rational decisions for themselves in terms of their own interests and preferences, they were vulnerable to exploitation because of conditions in their environment that they were powerless to change.
The lesson of the Tuskegee Study is not only that vulnerable people can be easily exploited, but also that health care
professionals do not always act in the best interests of their
patients. It shows how scientific objectivity can be infected
with bias. It suggests that abstract concepts like autonomy,
self-determination, and informed consent have little meaning
in circumstances where an individual's ability to protect himself or herself is blunted by persons and forces that are
authoritative and powerful.
Black experience as objects in medical research and experimentation has left a legacy of distrust that continues to affect the behavior and beliefs of blacks.4 2 There is concern that

41. See Allan M. Brandt, Racism and Research: The Case of the Tuskegee
Syphilis Study, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1978, at 21, 23. Brandt provides
a detailed account of the many negative stereotypes about blacks that influenced those who formulated the study.
42. See Dula, supra note 25, at 347; Vanessa Northington Gamble, A Legacy of Distrust: African-Americans and Medical Research, 9 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 35-38; James H. Jones, The Tuskegee Legacy:AIDS and the Black Community, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1992,
at 38.
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despite reforms in the conduct of human experimentation
blacks are devalued in the modern research context.43 Distrust
is also evident in organ donations. Historically, blacks have
been less likely than whites to agree to organ donation.'
Blacks have consistently identified the concern that they might
not receive adequate care in the hospital as a reason for not becoming an organ donor.4" Louis Farrakhan's statement in a
1994 speech that whites do not stop black-on-black violence because it provides a source of organs for whites,' while controversial, echoes the fear expressed by many blacks that somehow
their lives as organ donors would be valued less than the lives
of white recipients.
This distrust of the medical profession and the feeling that
black lives are devalued in our society is also reflected in the
allegations of genocidal intent that frequently arise within the
African-American community.. The Tuskegee Study left its
mark in this respect with the widespread and often repeated
(mis)understanding that the men of Tuskegee were deliberately infected with syphilis.' 7 The genocide allegation also
arose in connection with efforts to establish sickle-cell anemia

43. In a recent government-sponsored measles vaccine study in which a
large proportion of the subjects were African-Americans and other minorities,
parents were not informed that the vaccine was experimental and not licensed
for use in the United States or that it was associated with an increase in
death rates in other countries. See Charles Marwick, Questions RaisedAbout
Measles Vaccine Trial, 276 JAMA 1288 (1996). The FDA's recent adoption of
regulations allowing waiver of informed consent of research subjects in emergency room research has also raised concern that minorities are likely to be
disproportionately the subjects of the research. See Gamble, supra note 38, at
1776-77 (noting that racism pervades health care).
44. See Clive 0. Callender et al., Attitudes Among Blacks Toward Donating Kidneys for Transplantation:A Pilot Project, 74 J. NAT'L MED. ASs'N 807
(1982).
45. See, e.g., Callender et al., supra note 44, at 809; Why More Blacks Do
Not Donate Organs,JET, Dec. 11, 1995, at 15 ("Many Blacks don't want to sign
as organ donors because they feel if Tm in an accident and they know rm an
organ donor, they might want to use my organ. I go into the hospital to have
a toenail removed and come out with no kidney or something like that.'); see
also Robert F. Creecy & Roosevelt Wright, Correlates of Willingness to Consider Organ DonationAmong Blacks, 31 SOC. ScL & MED. 1229, 1230 (1990)
(associating blacks willingness to consider donation with confidence in the
medical doctors and perceived need for organs among blacks).
46. See FarrakhanLinks Race to Transplants,N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1994,
at A18.
47. See Gamble, supra note 38, at 1775 (noting, among other things, that
this misunderstanding was reported in April 1997 on a major network newscast).
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screening programs and birth control programs.' More recently, the allegation has arisen in connection with the AIDS
epidemic. Professor Gamble cites to surveys indicating that up
to one-third of African-Americans believe either that the AIDS
virus was created to infect African-Americans or that it could
have been created for that purpose. 9
In short, African-Americans have reason believe that they
are not always viewed as persons of unconditioned worth who
are deserving of respect. These beliefs are reenforced because
so little progress has been made in improving the health status
of African-Americans.
THE ABSENCE OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY

IN HEALTH CARE ACCESS AND DISTIBUTION
From the time blacks were first brought to America, one
fact has been overwhelming: Blacks by any measure have been
sicker and die younger than whites. Initially, medical theories
affirmed race-based explanations, as opposed to social and economic ones, for the difference in health status between blacks
and whites. 0 For example, during the post-emancipation period, census reports, insurance statistics, and military data all
indicated high mortality and morbidity rates among blacks. It
was believed that the peculiar susceptibility of blacks to disease, vice, and crime were responsible for these differences."
At times, belief in the inherent differences between blacks
and whites posed obstacles to sorting through the complexities
of disease such as tuberculosis and syphilis.' It was reassuring for whites to believe that a disease affected whites and
blacks differently (and blacks more harshly) or that close observation confirmed the presence of two diseases rather than
one. Negative stereotypes about blacks were frequently employed to justify perceived disparities in disease or health
status disparities between blacks and whites. Often these
stereotypes involved sexual promiscuity, intellectual performance, or susceptibility of blacks to disease and vice.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See, e.g., Haller, supra note 31, at 155-67; Marion M. Torchia, The
Tuberculosis Movement and the Race Question, 1890-1950, 49 BULL. HIST.
MED. 152 (1975).
51. Haller, supra note 31, at 155-67.
52. For a good example of this phenomenon, see Gamble & Blustein, supra note 30, at 180-82.
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Explicit discrimination against African-Americans in all
areas of medicine was the norm until the mid-1960s. As P.
Preston Reynolds notes, "African-American students were denied admission to most medical and nursing schools, [AfricanAmerican] physicians were rejected from membership to state
and national medical societies, and African-Americans were refused care at most hospitals in this country." Moreover, the
Hospital Survey and Construction Act (Hill-Burton Act),
passed in 1946, contained a provision that required that hospital facilities of equal quality be built for minorities, thus introducing the concept "separate but equal" into health care. As
Justice Harlan points out in his dissent in Plessey v. Ferguson,
the "real meaning" of segregation is "that colored citizens are
so inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in
public coaches [or to share hospital wards and doctors' waiting
rooms] occupied by white citizens. " '
This explicit segregation in health care did not begin to
change until the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
prohibited provision of federal funds to programs and institutions
that discriminated on the basis of race. The creation of the
Medicare program in 1965 virtually assured that every hospital in
the nation would be subject to the Act.55
Although hospitals, unlike public schools, were required by
the federal government to comply immediately with federal
guidelines promulgated to achieve integration, resistance was
strong. Nevertheless, substantial progress towards integration
of facilities providing health care services was eventually
achieved. Yet there is little reason to believe, in the health
domain any more than in public education, that desegregation
brought about equal access or equal quality of health care for
blacks." There is evidence to suggest that contemporary
changes in the U.S. health care system is causing a further
decline in an admittedly small pool of African-American physicians. In 1890 there were fourteen black medical schools.
Today there are only four predominantly black schools training

53. P. Preston Reynolds, The Federal Government's Use of Title VI and
Medicare to Racially Integrate Hospitals in the United States, 1963 Through
1967, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1850, 1850 (1997).
54. 163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
55. See Reynolds, supra note 53, at 1850.
56. For a thoughtful series of essays on the difficulty of eliminating separate but equal in public education, see SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES
ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (Derrick Bell ed., 1980).
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African-American physicians. Moreover, the persistent disparities in health care status between blacks and whites indicate
that we have a long way to go before equal opportunity in
health care will be achieved.
African-Americans perceive that they are treated differently within the health care system. They are more likely than
whites to report difficulties in obtaining access to the health
care system and, once they obtain care, to express dissatisfaction with the care they receive, including their communications
with health care providers.57 The perceptions of racial disparities in the health care system are supported by a host of studies demonstrating racial differences in health status, access to
health care, and quality of health across a variety of conditions
and settings. While the majority of African-Americans may not
be familiar with the details of these studies, reports about
them in the media reinforce the perception that AfricanAmerican lives are devalued in our society.58 The results of a
recent study of Medicare beneficiaries-combined with other
studies of racial disparities in health that persist after controlling for other factors thought to influence health, such as
age, sex, insurance status, income, disease severity, other
health conditions, and underlying incidence and prevalence
rates-led one commentator to conclude that "although both
race and income have effects, race was the overriding determinant of disparities in care" and that "[hligher incomes for
blacks had a modifying-but never an equalizing-effect on
black/white ratios for" certain types of care.59

57. See, e.g., Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Black-White Disparities in Health Care, 263 JAMA 2344, 2345 (1990) (discussing evidence of disparities in medical treatment); Sally Trude & David C. Colby, Monitoringthe
Impact of the MedicareFee Schedule on Access to Carefor Vulnerable Populations, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POLY & LAW 49, 55 (1997) (citing R.J. Blendon et al.,
Access to Medical Carefor Black and White Americans: A Matter of Continuing Concern, 261 JAMA 278 (1989) and L.J. Cornelius, Barriers to Medical
Care for White, Black, and Hispanic American Children, 85 J. NAT'L MED.
ASS'N 281 (1993)).
58. For example, the preliminary results of a study looking at differences
in life expectancies within different communities in the United States was reported on the front page of the Dec. 4, 1997, Washington Post under the headline "Death Knocks Sooner for D.C.'s Black Men."
59. H. Jack Geiger, Race and Health Care-An American Dilemma?, 335
NEW ENG. J. MED. 815, 816 (1996) (citing Marian E. Gornick et al., Effects of
Race and Income on Mortality and Use of Services Among Medicare Beneficiaries, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 791, 794 (1996)).

1998]

EMPOWERING & PROTECTINGPATIENTS

1033

Evidence of the racial disparities in health and health care
comes in a number of different forms. For example, the U.S.
mortality statistics have provided dramatic evidence of the
racial difference in health status year in and year out. These
statistics reveal that African-Americans have an overall mortality rate approximately seventy percent higher than that of
whites.' In addition, black infants continued to die at almost
two-and-a-half times the rate of white infants." The mortality
differences exist across disease categories, such that the 1995
age-adjusted death rates for blacks were higher than the rates
for whites for most of the leading causes of death. 2 Indeed, a
recent study reported that declines in breast cancer mortality
were found only among white, not black, women.'
African-Americans also experience higher morbidity with
respect to various disease categories, including diabetes, high
blood pressure, and AIDS.' Similarly, numerous studies have
demonstrated that African-Americans, when they receive care,
receive different care than whites for the same conditions. For
example, a number of studies have shown that blacks are less
likely to receive angiography or to undergo coronary artery bypass surgery or angioplasty than whites.65 Some of these dif60. The racial difference in overall mortality rates (a ratio of 1.7) has
persisted since 1987 and represents an increase from the 1960-1986 period,
when the death ratio was approximately 1.5. See Robert N. Anderson et at,
Report of Final Mortality Statistics, 1995, 45 MONTHLY VITAL STAT. REP. 2
(1997).
61. See id. at 2-3, 11.
62. See id. at 2, 8.
63. See Frances Chevarley & Emily White, Recent Trends in Breast Cancer Mortality Among White and Black US Women, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
775, 777 (1997).
64- See U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, PUB. No. (PHS) 91-

50212, HEALTHY PEOPLE 2000: NATIONAL HEALTH PROMOTION AND DISEASE
PREVENTION OBJECTIVES 33 (1991) (noting that diabetes is a third more com-

mon in blacks than whites, severe high blood pressure is four times more
common in black men than white men, AIDS is three times more common in
blacks than in whites, and between 10 and 15 times more common in black
women than white women).
65. See, e.g., Marie A. Bernard, The Health Status of African-American
Elderly, 85 J. NAT'L MED. ASs'N 521, 522 (1993); Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 57, at 2344-45; Geiger, supra note 59, at 815. Treatment differences have also been demonstrated for pneumonia, cesarean sections, and kidney disease, see Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra
note 57 at 2344-45 (and studies cited therein), as well as breast cancer, see
John Z. Ayanian & Edward Guadagnoli, Variations in Breast Cancer Treatment by Patient and Provider Characteristics,40 BREAST CANCER RES. &
TREATMENT 65, 72 (1996) (noting that black women are less likely than white

1034

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:1015

ferences in health status, but not all, may be explained by the
fact that blacks are less likely than whites to have access to
health care. For example, blacks are less likely than whites to
have insurance" and they make fewer visits to office based
physicians than whites.67 In addition, regardless of income
level, blacks are at least twice as likely as whites to obtain
their care regularly in a clinic or an emergency room setting."
Recent studies suggest, however, that these disparities in
access to treatment remain even when blacks gain access to the
health care system. 9 For example, a number of studies have
shown that blacks still have fewer physician visits and receive
different treatments than whites,7" even within Medicare or
Veteran's Affairs populations where disparities in access have
been minimized or eliminated.7 Not only have studies shown
women to receive breast cancer treatment consistent with national guide-

lines).
66. See Bureau of the Census, Health Insurance Coverage Status, by Selected Characteristics:1987-1994, in U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1996, 120 (116th ed. 1996).
67. See Bureau of the Census, Visits to Office Based Physicians,in U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1996,
125 (116th ed. 1996).
68. See Barbara Bloom et al., Access to Health Care Part 2: Working-Age
Adults, 197 VITAL & HEALTH STAT., Series 10, 4 (1997).
69. See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 57, at 2344.
70. See, e.g., Marian E. Gornick et al., Effects of Race and Income on Mortality and Use of Services Among Medicare Beneficiaries, 335 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 791, 793 (1996) (reporting that black Medicare patients made 7.2 office
visits compared to 8.1 visits for white Medicare patients); Philip J. Held et al,
Access to Kidney Transplantation:Has the United States Eliminated Income
and Racial Difference?, 148 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2594 (1988) (stating
that black Medicare beneficiaries are less likely than whites to receive a kidney transplant); Katherine L. Kahn et al., Health Care for Black and Poor
Hospitalized Medicare Patients,271 JAMA 1169 (1994) (observing that black
Medicare patients were less likely than whites to receive mammograms); Eric
D. Peterson et al., Racial Variation in CardiacProcedure Use and Survival
FollowingAcute MyocardialInfarction in the Departmentof Veterans Affairs,
271 JAMA 1175, 1178 (1994) (finding that blacks in Veterans Affairs system
are less likely than whites to undergo coronary artery bypass grafting, angioplasty and coronary revascularization); Trude & Colby, supra note 57, at
56-57 (noting that black Medicare beneficiaries were more likely than whites
and other beneficiaries to report access problems, delay in medical care, and
lack of a usual source of care).
71. Medicare minimizes the inequalities in access to health care by providing premium-free hospital benefits to people over age 65 with qualifying
work history, permitting those resident citizens without qualifying work history to purchase this insurance, and providing all resident citizens the opportunity to purchase supplemental medical insurance (for example, for outpatient services). See DAVID CALKINS ET AL., HEALTH CARE POLICY 105-06, 112
(1995). Although some gaps in coverage remain, Medicare has improved ac-
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that blacks are less likely than whites to receive certain, more
common treatments, but that blacks are more likely than
whites to receive certain, less common treatments. For example,
blacks are more than three-and-a-half times more likely than
whites to undergo amputation of all or part of the lower limb,
even though diabetes mellitus (the most common reason for the
amputation) is only 1.7 times as prevalent in elderly blacks as
in whites.' In addition, there is evidence that, among patients
seen in similar hospitals, blacks receive poorer quality of
treatment than whites.'
While the racial disparities in treatment decisions cannot
be denied, the reasons for the disparities are harder to identify.74 Because race is often used as a proxy for socioeconomic
status,7 5 some have suggested that the racial disparities seen in
health and health care reflects socioeconomic or class differences,
rather than racial differences.7' However, racial differences in
health and health care persist in studies that control or adjust
for indicators of socioeconomic status, such as income, educational level, and insurance status. For example, a recent study
that compared mortality rates among blacks and among whites
living in comparable areas demonstrated that, although both
poor blacks and poor whites experienced mortality rates higher
than nationwide rates, poor blacks had lower survival rates
than poor whites in all but one location.' This and other
cess to care among previously underserved populations. See Jos6 J. Escarce
et al., RacialDifferences in the Elderly's Use of Medical Proceduresand Diagnostic Tests, 83 AM. J.PUB. HEALTH 948, 948 (1993).
The Veterans Health Administration system provides medical care to all
veterans who are disabled or financially disadvantaged without regard to patient's ability to pay. Patients within the Veterans Affairs system are more
likely than patients in the private sector to share the same socioeconomic
status (middle- to low-income). See Peterson et al, supra note 70, at 1178.
72. See Gornick et al., supra note 70, at 791.
73. See Kahn et al., supra note 70, at 1169 (finding differences in care in
similar hospitals for black Medicare patients hospitalized with congestive
heart failure, acute myocardial infarction, pneumonia, and cerebrovascular
accident compared to other beneficiaries).
74 See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 57, at 2345
(observing the difficulty of drawing firm conclusions from studies regarding
the role of race in medical treatment).
75. See, e.g., David R. Williams, Socioeconomic Differentials in Health:A
Review and Redirection, 53 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 81, 83 (1990) (observing that
minority group status is sometimes included as an indicator of socioeconomic

status).
76. See, e.g., Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 57, at
2345-46.
77. Arline T. Geronimus et al., Excess Mortality Among Blacks and
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studies indicate that socioeconomic status alone cannot account for all of the documented racial differences in health and
health care.
If racial disparities in health and health care access persist among populations in which access issues have been
equalized or minimized and among populations which face
similar economic difficulties and barriers, we must look beyond
access to explain the continuing disparities. Are there differences among the races in their interactions with the health
system that might explain the disparities in health status between blacks and whites?
In addressing this question, some commentators have suggested that blacks and whites may differ in terms of their
treatment preferences. 8 There is some support for this hypothesis. For example, the Coronary Artery Surgery Study
found that whites were more likely than blacks to elect to have
bypass surgery, even when some other, less invasive therapy
was recommended; it also found that blacks were ten percent
more likely than whites to decline an invasive treatment.79 Differences by race have also been documented with respect to
preferences for using life-sustaining treatments.0 However,
blacks still are treated differently, even when their preferences
are the same. 81

Cultural differences in the clinical encounter may account
for some of these disparities. Clinical decisionmaking takes
place within the context of a clinical relationship. Accordingly,
clinical decisions are necessarily influenced by the social strucWhites in the United States, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1552, 1555 (1996).
78. See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 57, at 2346
(noting that income differences are probably the most important exploration
for medical treatment disparities between blacks and whites).
79. Charles Maynard et al., Blacks in the CoronaryArtery Surgery Study
(CASS): Race and Clinical Decision Making, 76 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1446,
1446 (1986). However, the small percentage of black enrollees in the study
may limit the generalizability of this observation.
80. In one study, black patients were almost three times as likely as
white patients to indicate they wanted more treatment, while whites were
almost two-and-a-half times more likely then blacks to indicate they wanted
less treatment. See Joanne Mills Garrett et al., Life-Sustaining Treatments
During Terminal Illness: Who Wants What?, 8 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 361,
364 (1993).
81. For example, physicians treating AIDS patients were less likely to
have conversations about resuscitation with patients of color even though
their interest in having such a discussion was similar to that of whites. See
Jennifer S. Haas et al., Discussion of Preferencesfor Life-Sustaining Care by
Personswith AIDS, 153 ARCHIVEs INTERNAL MED. 1241, 1246 (1993).
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ture and context in which they are made. The "sociologic influences" on the clinical decision include the "social characteristics of patients and physicians, patterns of social interaction
and authority in clinical settings, and the structure of health
care organizations. " ' For example, cultural differences can result in medical advice that does not "fitP the patient's values
and conceptions. They can also result in a physician ignoring
the patient's values and conceptions. In neither case will optimum health be achieved. To the extent that medicine's approach to a problem does not coincide with a patient's beliefs,
patient noncompliance and dissatisfaction with health care are
likely results.'
Cultural differences also give rise to communication problems between patient and health care provider. For example,
studies have documented that white and black patients express themselves differently within the medical encounter.'
To the extent that black patients downplay or fail to discuss
their symptoms, their health care is likely to suffer.85 More importantly, to the extent that African-American patients use different language or frame their decisions differently from that
of their physicians, they are at greater risk of having their decisions ignored or overridden. One study of physician-patient
encounters found that
the person who hears a vernacular [e.g., Black English] dialect spoken tends to devalue the speaker of that dialect. Consciously or unconsciously, dialect speakers tend to get worse treatment, wait longer
for service, are considered ignorant, and are told what to do rather
than asked what they would like to do. Therefore, the effect of the

82. Jack A. Clark et al., Bringing Social Structure Back into ClinicalDecisionMaking, 32 SOC. SCI. & MED. 853, 854 (1991).
83. See Kleinman et al., supra note 14, at 252.
84. See, e.g., Sybil L. Crawford et al., Do Blacks and Whites Differ in
Their Use of Health Carefor Symptoms of CoronaryHeartDisease?, 84 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 957 (1994) (discussing the fact that blacks with repeated chest
pain were more likely than whites never to have discussed their pain with
their doctor); James M. Raczynski et al, Diagnoses, Symptoms, and Attribution of Symptoms Among Black and White Inpatients Admitted for Coronary
Artery Disease, 84 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 951, 955 (1994) (finding blacks reported fewer painful symptoms and were more likely to attribute their symptoms to noncardiac origins); Rayna Rapp, ConstructingAmniocentesis: Maternal and Medical Discourses, in UNCERTAIN TERMS: NEGOTIATING GENDER IN
AMERICAN CULTURE 28, 31-32 (Faye Ginsburg & Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing
eds., 1990) (reporting that black women were less likely than white women to
use medical language in responding to an offer of amniocentesis).
85. See, e.g., Raczynski et al., supra note 84, at 955 (offering the difference in reporting symptoms as an explanation for the differences in coronary
care treatment).
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patient's vernacular dialect in the medical interview is a potential
source of interference to the effective exchange of information."

Cultural differences may create difficulties not only in
communication; they may also make health providers less comfortable in their dealings with their patients. This discomfort
may hinder effective communication or preclude some communication altogether. 7 For example, at least two studies
have suggested that blacks are less likely to be approached for
organ donation by predominately white medical teams."
Similarly, studies have demonstrated that physicians caring
for people with IlV were less likely to discuss end-of-life decisions with their patients of color. 9
Finally, physicians' unconscious stereotypes and biases,
generally influenced by cultural differences, although sometimes influenced by views of biological differences,' may affect

86. Roger W. Shuy, Three Types of Interference to an Effective Exchange
of Information in the Medical Interview, in THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF
DOCTOR-PATIENT COMMUNICATION 189, 192 (Sue Fisher & Alexandra Dundas
Todd eds., 1983); see also ALEXANDRA DuNDAS TODD, INTIMATE ADVERSARIES:
CULTURAL CONFLICT BETWEEN DOCTORS AND WOMEN PATIENTS 77 (1989)
(observing a trend in a qualitative study of physician-patient encounters on
reproductive issues that 'the darker a woman's skin and/or the lower her
place on the economic scale, the poorer the care and efforts at explanation she
received").
87. Based on her review of the literature and her own experience and research, Jennifer Daley concluded that "[platients of a different cultural, ethnic
and socioeconomic background from their physicians are ... less likely to receive information from their doctors." Jennifer Daley, Overcoming the Barrier
of Words, in THROUGH THE PATIENTS' EYES 72, 83 (Margaret Gerteis et al.
eds., 1993).
88. See Mary S. Hartwig et al., Effect of Organ Donor Race on Health
Team Procurement Efforts, 128 ARCHIVE SURGERY 1331, 1332-1333 (1993)
(finding that race had a strong influence on identifying organ donors and on
actually requesting donation); Alice A. Mitchell & William E. Sedlacek, Ethnically Sensitive Messengers:An Exploration of RacialAttitudes of Health-Care
Workers and Organ ProcurementOfficers, 88 J. NAT'L MED. ASSN 349, 351-52
(1996) (concluding that organ procurement employees may experience cognitive dissonance when dealing with donors of color).
89. See, e.g., Haas et al., supra note 81, at 1246. The Haas study confirmed another study's conclusion that "persons with HIV infection were more
likely to have been counseled about advance directives if they were male,
white, homosexual or bisexual men or well educated." See J. Teno et al., The
Use of Formal PriorAdvance Directives Among HIV-Related Diseases, 5 J.
GEN. INTERNAL MED. 490 (1990).
90. In a study of racial differences in cardiac treatment in the Veterans
Affairs system, researchers pointed out that it had been believed that blacks
had worse outcomes than whites following coronary artery bypass surgery,
although that belief has not been borne out in the literature. See Peterson et
al., supra note 70, at 1179.
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health care decisionmaking.91 For example, some have suggested that the medical criteria used in clinical decisionmaking
may reflect or incorporate unconscious biases.' Others have
suggested that perceptions of the patient's support system,
which may reflect the physician's racial and cultural biases,
may influence the decisionmaking process.93 Physicians' racial
and cultural biases have been documented through the anecdotes of African-American patients. In her recent article,
Vanessa Northington Gamble relates two powerful examples of
racial stereotyping experienced in the emergency room. In one,
an African-American professor of nursing describes how her
symptoms of severe abdominal pain were met immediately
with questions regarding the number of sexual partners she
had, recalling persistent stereotypes of black women as sexually promiscuous. The other (reported in the Los Angeles
Times) describes the experience of an African-American medical school administrator with a broken arm who was assumed
to be a welfare mother and told to hold her arm as if she were
holding a can of beer.' In a similar vein, Herbert Nickens refers to his own experience in comparing the ways in which
white health care workers treat those with cystic fibrosis
(affects primarily whites) and sickle-cell anemia (affects primarily blacks). He opines that health care workers often question
whether those with sickle cell disease are having real pain or
are exhibiting analgesic drug-seeking behavior.95 Finally,
9L See, e.g., Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 57, at
2346 ("Disparities in treatment decisions may reflect the existence of subconscious bias."); Escarce et al., supra note 71, at 953 (1993) (suggesting that
"E[the effect of patient race on physician and institutional decision making"
may be the cause of persistent racial differences in treatment).
92. See, e.g., Michael Lowe et al., "These Sorts of People Don't Do Very
Well": Race and Allocation of Health Care Resources, 21 J. MED. ETHICS 356,
358 (1995) (suggesting that seemingly objective outcome criteria such as likely
graft survival, patient survival, quality-of-style measures, and presence of
significant co-morbidity or disability used to identify recipients who are most
likely to benefit from kidney transplantation may incorporate subtle racial
discrimination, for example, when prevalence of certain co-morbidities is
higher in a minority population).
93. See, e.g., Peterson et al, supra note 70, at 1179.
94. See Gamble, supra note 38, at 1776.
95. See Nickens, supra note 29, at 67. Nickens's opinion was dramatized
in a recent episode of the NBC medical show, ER. In that episode, an AfricanAmerican man presented to the ER, complaining of pain from a sickle-cell episode and requesting a specific dosage of a specific pain killer. The emergency
room doctor who initially treated him discounted his story about his condition
and refused to provide the requested medicine. When the patient later re-
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physicians' racial and cultural biases can be inferred from their
behavior. For example, the Coronary Artery Surgery Study
demonstrated that providers are more likely to recommend
whites for bypass surgery than blacks, "despite similar clinical
and angiographic characteristics." 6 In a similar vein, researchers found that physicians in one Florida county were
almost ten times as likely to report a black woman for substance abuse during pregnancy than a white women, even
though rates of drug usage were similar.' In addition, a 1987
review of cases of court-ordered cesarean section demonstrated
that eighty-one percent of the women were women of color
(specifically, African-American, Asian, or Latina), twenty-four
percent of the women did not speak English as their primary
language, and all of the women were being treated at a teaching hospital clinic or were receiving public assistance. 8
The enduring disparities in health status between blacks
and whites perpetuate black mistrust of medicine. AfricanAmericans rightly wonder what sort of society would allow
such disparities to continue unchecked. They are understandably suspicious of those who express concern that blacks
are being denied a fair opportunity to assistance in ending
their lives if PAS is prohibited. These persistent disparities
also indicate that blacks may be severely disadvantaged in efforts to obtain respect for their health care preferences.
CONCLUSION

What lessons do the African-American experience with
medicine and the health care system provide for efforts to ensure that the interests and preferences of all patients will be
ceives the requested dosage from another emergency room doctor, the original
doctor berates the second doctor for "giving in" to the drug-seeking behavior.
ER (NBC television broadcast, Dec. 11, 1997).
96. Maynard et al., supra note 79, at 1446.
97. Ira J. Chasnoff et al., The Prevalence of Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use
During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas
County, Florida,322 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1202, 1203-04 (1990).

98. Veronika E.B. Kolder et al., Court-Ordered ObstetricalInterventions,
316 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1192 (1987). Commentators reviewing the court pro-

ceedings in these cases have indicated that the women's positions were discounted and viewed as inadequate and the women themselves were characterized negatively. See, e.g., Lisa C. Ikemoto, Furtheringthe Inquiry:Race, Class
and Culture in the ForcedMedical Treatment of PregnantWomen, 59 TENN. L.
REV. 487, 502-04 (1992); Susan Irwin & Brigitte Jordan, Knowledge, Practice,
and Power: Court-OrderedCesareanSections, 1 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 319,
329 (1987).
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respected should PAS be legalized? What does it mean to be
rendered vulnerable because of poverty, prejudice, negative
stereotypes, societal indifference, or membership in a stigmatized group?
Given the general distrust of medical institutions and the
medical profession and the belief that their lives are undervalued, African-Americans are likely to view the legalization of
PAS with suspicion. Rather than seeing it as an opportunity to
exercise their autonomy at the end of life, African-Americans
may sense that this is yet another way that less valued African-American lives can be eliminated. This distrust makes it
less likely that African-Americans will be easily manipulated
in making their end-of-life decisions. African-Americans may
question more vigorously the judgments of their health care
providers and resist compliance with the medical regimes recommended to them. While mistrust protects blacks in their
contacts with the health care system, it also presents obstacles
for them. It is important that patients trust their health care
providers, especially in end-of-life decisionmaking. If patients
are to participate in managing their illnesses, patients and
their families must have confidence in the information they
have received about diagnosis, prognosis, and options for care.
If the patient's mistrust motivates him or her to ignore these
recommendations, the patient may lose an important opportunity to manage her dying. Conflicts between patients and
families on the one hand and health care providers on the
other can severely compromise patients' ability to die with
dignity." Although the historical record is not subject to
change, it might be possible to reduce levels of distrust by
paying greater attention to eliminating disparities in health
status.
Difficulties that exist in the clinical encounter have significant implications for the practice of PAS. Cultural differences
between African-American patients and their health care providers may give rise to communication difficulties, either because of differences in values or because of differences in communication styles. However, those cultural differences may
create a barrier that prevents even the attempt to communicate about important personal issues like end-of-life care. In a
worst case scenario, the cultural differences may cause a phy-

99. See, e.g., Case Study: Mistrust, Racism and End-of-Life Treatment,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 1997, at 23.
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sician to discount his African-American patient's wishes to
such an extent that they are not honored. Improving medical
interactions between African-Americans and health care providers may require changes in the education and training of
health care providers.
The African-American experience with medicine also cautions against placing too much confidence in the ability of physicians and other health care providers to insure that patient
preferences are honored and respected. In the context of the
patient-physician relationship, physicians have power. This
power derives from several sources. The physician has superior knowledge and skill. The physician has broad discretion
and is not easily held accountable for actions by patients or society. Dying patients and their families are disadvantaged in
terms of questioning physicians by virtue of the crisis that they
find themselves in. They may also be disadvantaged by a
sense of helplessness that results from low socioeconomic
status or low self-esteem. In the face of the power inequities in
this relationship and the historical instances of misuse of
power, African-Americans appreciate that making PAS available as an option for terminally ill patients does not necessarily empower those who have been disadvantaged. An important implication of the power inequities in physician-patient
relationships is that greater equality for the seriously disadvantaged may be a precondition for the meaningful exercise of
autonomy.
Moreover, physicians do not exist in isolation from the social milieu in which they find themselves any more than, patients do. Both physicians and patients absorb the prevailing
norms, values, and beliefs of the society. Physicians may have
assimilated the negative messages about some groups. For example, physicians may be too quick to interpret ambivalent
statements made by patients as being pleas to die, because at
an unconscious level they perceive the patient as not deserving
of money, resources, or other efforts that might be needed for
care. Alternately, patients may have absorbed the negative
messages that society has heaped upon them and perceive
themselves to be unworthy of the efforts that might be needed
to prolong their treatment or provide them with palliative
treatment. These patients might be easily coerced into believing that it would be easier for them and for others if their lives
ended sooner. As a consequence, patients will not be able to effectively manage end-of-life care decisions. They may not be
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willing to discuss their medical problems with health care professionals. Still others may be unwilling to risk the lack of respect that they have encountered with health professionals in
the past. In neither scenario will the patient receive optimum
care. Thus, requirements for concurring physician diagnoses
or that patients make repeated requests for PAS may not provide
meaningffil protection." The essential point is that physicians
have broad discretion and power. Unless there is confidence in
physician objectivity and lack of unconscious bias, such cynicism is valid.
One commentator perceptively notes, "How in the world
...
is a white, middle class, twenty-five year old male doctor,
who wants to perform his role in the most intelligent and beneficent way, to approach a poor, aging, folk-educated, black,
female patient?"10 1 At a minimum, before health care providers
can maximize the participation of African-American patients' in
end-of-life decisions they must know and appreciate the realities
of their patients lives. Essentially, however, the appeal to develop thick descriptions of patients as persons situated in
broader social, historical, and cultural contexts is really an invitation to have a conversation before PAS becomes an option
in our health care system. This conversation should be about
the changes and modifications that are required in the training
of health care providers and the delivery of health care services
before we can be confident that all patients will have the opportunity to die with dignity.

100. One commentator makes the point that features of the Oregon Death

with Dignity Act (the only state law that permits PAS) are likely to enhance
the coercive features of the physician-patient relationship. He writes:
The doctor informs the patient of her diagnosis and prognosis, determines whether the patient is capable or in need of counseling, and
ensures and records that all the required procedural steps had been
taken.... Although the requirement that a second doctor confirm
the diagnosis may in theory help to alleviate this problem, in practice
a doctor called to confirm a colleagne's diagnosis or prognosis is unlikely to disagree with her assessment.
See Patrick Curran, Regulating the Unregulatable:Oregon's Death with Dignity Act and the Legalization of Physician-AssistedSuicide, 86 GEo. L.J. 725
(1998).
101. TRIBULATIONS & CELEBRATIONS, supra note 17, at xvii.

